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Abstract: Promotional activity proved key to the success of department stores in fending 
off competition from the expanding chain stores by drawing in customers to their large, 
central, premises. This paper uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative archival 
data to examine the promotional methods of interwar British department stores, variations 
in the promotional mix between types of store, and returns to promotional activities. A 
number of distinct regional promotional strategies are identified, shaped by variations in 
the types of consumer markets served. Meanwhile there was considerable policy 
convergence among stores towards using promotional activity primarily as a means of 
imprinting a strong institutional brand image in the minds of the consuming public. 
 





  The interwar period has been characterised as the `golden age’ of advertising, 
with a major increase in national advertising expenditure (partly reversed during the 
1929-32 depression) and considerable developments in both the visual qualities of 
adverts and the sophistication of the marketing messages conveyed.
i Yet there has 
been relatively little industry-level research regarding the motivations behind the 
expansion in advertising expenditure; variations in advertising strategies; the 
relationship between press advertising and other promotional media; and the returns to 
investment in advertising and promotion. 
                                                   
1 We thank Nat Ishino for excellent research assistance. Our thanks are also due to the staff of the 
British Library of Political and Economic Science Archives, Harrods Company Archive, History of 
Advertising Trust, John Lewis Partnership Archive, and the Victoria and Albert Museum Archives, for 
their generous help and assistance. Draft not to be quoted without the authors permission. 
Corresponding author James Walker (j.t.walker@reading.ac.uk). All errors are our own. 
  1This paper examines these issues with regard to the most important class of 
retailer-advertiser in interwar Britain, the department store sector. While even 
Pasdermadjian and the Retail Distributors Association (who used a broader definition 
of department stores than that of Jefferys’ seminal retailing study) put their share of 
national retail sales in the late 1930s at only 7.5 per cent, Kaldor and Silverman 
estimated that department and drapery stores represented 50.9 per cent of national 
advertising by retailers.
ii This was linked to the department store `business model’, 
which required promotion-intensive strategies. One of their key appeals was that of 
‘universal provider’, stocking a vast range of goods which could satisfy all their 
customers’ needs under one roof, a form of retailing peculiarly suited to serving 
customers from a single, centrally-located, store.  Thus, unlike the multiple chains 
(from which they faced growing competition) department stores could not easily 
expand business via the proliferation of branches.
iii Instead they sought to increase 
throughput by drawing in more customers to their central locations via extensive and 
elaborate advertising and promotional activity.  
Success in maintaining customer flow was vital to their survival, as 
department stores had high fixed costs, which made profits very sensitive to sales 
volumes.
iv Yet in adopting a promotion-intensive strategy they invested heavily in an 
activity which was notorious for the absence of any reliable method for measuring 
returns to investment. The quotation, ‘I know half the money I spend on advertising is 
wasted; but I can never find out which half,’ attributed variously to John Wanamaker 
(the father of the American department store); Frank W. Woolworth; and the first 
Lord Leverhulme, was echoed in the internal policy debates of interwar British 
department stores. Nor did the major expansion of advertising and market research 
  2during the post-1945 decades bring with it any breakthrough in reliable techniques for 
appraising the impact and effectiveness of advertising campaigns.
v
This paper draws on both archival evidence from several major stores and an 
extensive dataset of department store operating expenditures to analyse the various 
publicity strategies employed by UK department stores. Unlike many studies, it 
focuses on promotion as a broad activity, incorporating press advertising, non-press 
advertising, direct mail, in-store displays, and crowd-pulling publicity stunts. We 
identify both considerable diversity in the weightings given to these activities between 
individual establishments (as stores sought to both capitalise on specialist staff and 
distinguish themselves from their competitors) and the presence of distinct regional 
strategies - reflecting differences in market conditions. The survival of a substantial 
proportion of the original returns from a major contemporary survey of British 
department stores makes it possible to quantify these trends and examine the impact of 
promotional expenditure and strategies on department store performance.  
 
II. Promotional media 
 
  Department stores used a range of promotional media to draw in customers. 
These can be classified (and were classified by contemporaries) under four broad 
headings: press advertising; direct mail; other advertising (which included both non-
press adverts – on vehicles, at the cinema, in theatre programmes, etc., and physical 
events such as exhibitions, demonstrations and crowd-pulling publicity stunts); and 
store window and interior displays.  
Press advertising constituted the largest single category of promotional 
expenditure. It was widely regarded as the main form of advertising and was easily 
  3accessible for smaller stores without the need to employ in-house specialist staff – 
through the use of advertising agents. Press advertising guaranteed that the store’s 
messages would reach a very wide audience (though not always one that was closely 
targeted to the specific geographical or socio-economic market which the firm wanted 
to reach).  
Some authors have suggested that stores over-invested in press advertising 
compared to alternative promotional media. Lomax argued that the independent and 
professional status of advertising agents helped them persuade retailers to divert an 
unduly large proportion of their marketing budgets to press advertising – at the 
expense of other promotional activities such as display, whose advocates were 
internal employees, lacking similar status and prestige.
vi There were also indirect 
pressures favouring newspaper adverts over other promotional media. Heavy press 
spending fostered positive editorial coverage (especially with respect to provincial 
stores, advertising in local newspapers) and often ensured a sympathetic press 
response regarding, for example, local political decisions which effected their 
interests - such as proposed road schemes which might divert customer flow.
vii
Direct mailings offered department stores a more targeted medium for getting 
their marketing messages to particular audiences. The address details of account 
customers could be used to develop mailing lists, while other ‘screening’ methods 
could be applied to mailings targeted at new customers. For example, in 1932 the 
prestigious London store Heal’s responded to the depression in furniture sales by 
developing a new range of cheaper furniture, publicised via a marketing booklet 
‘Heal’s Economy Furniture for 1932 and All That. ’ In selecting 32,000 London and 
Home Counties households to receive copies, houses with an annual rental value of 
£50-£100 (and to flats at up to £140), were selected, with an additional qualification 
  4that only householders with a telephone would be circularised.
viii Direct mailing also 
developed customer perceptions of having a long-term relationship with the store. 
Department store circulars often adopted a ‘confidential style’ in order to foster this 
perception, being written so as to give the appearance of a personal letter.
ix
Direct mail included both leaflets advertising particular sales or product lines, and 
mail order catalogues. Catalogues sometimes ran to 100 pages or more and were 
extensively illustrated, often using colour pictures or other high quality illustrations. The 
most extensive sometimes became, in effect, a virtual representation of the store. 
Catalogues allowed stores to both extend their geographical reach beyond their normal 
catchment areas and meet competition from the expanding mail order retailers such as 
Kay’s, Littlewoods, and Great Universal Stores. This was of particular importance during 
the interwar period, when many department stores moved towards serving a new ‘mass’ 
(lower middle and working-class) market, in direct competition with the mail order 
houses. Catalogues also played an important informational role – many being sent 
seasonally, for example, to advertise new fashions. 
Mail order expenditure had the advantage of being directly traceable to sales 
(though stores appreciated that it also led to additional trade by stimulating personal visits 
from customers). Major central London department stores relied on mail order for a 
significant proportion of turnover; for example mail order business averaged 16.8 per cent 
of Harrods’ total sales over the five years to 31
st January 1932.
x Direct mailings may also 
have attracted some of Harrods’ customers from the London suburbs and from outside the 
London area (accounting for 25.1 and 21.7 per cent per cent of Harrods’ sales, including 
mail order, respectively).  
Non-press advertising in theatre programmes, promotional films in cinemas, and 
via posters on trams, buses and hoardings, had similar advantages to direct mail in 
that they targeted a more precise audience than press adverts. A poster in one of 
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decisions of a visitor arriving from the provinces than an advert he/she had seen in a 
national newspaper, while the viewers of a poster on the side of a bus routed along 
Oxford Street would include a still higher proportion of people who were likely to 
visit a department store on the day in question. 
Publicity stunts played a much more important role in department store promotion 
than was the case after 1945. These were particularly useful for stores with a large 
potential catchment area relative to their normal customer-flow, such as outer London 
suburbs with good arterial road access. Gordon Selfridge, who introduced many key 
American retailing innovations to the UK with the opening of his London store in 1909, is 
credited as having brought American-style showmanship to the British department store. 
During his first year he exhibited all the pictures rejected for the Royal Academy Summer 
Show on his third floor and displayed Bleriot’s plane the day after it had crossed the 
Channel (drawing over 150,000 people in four days).
xi
By the 1930s department store demonstrations, exhibitions, and publicity stunts 
had reached an all time peak, including events which have passed into local folklore. One 
of the most famous practitioners was Bentall’s of Kingston on Thames (which enjoyed a 
new road-borne market thanks to the opening of the Kingston Bypass). Under its new 
Publicity Director, Eric Fleming, a number of crowd-pulling events were regularly sprung 
upon an appreciative public, ranging from displaying world speed record holder Sir 
Malcolm Campbell’s Bluebird automobile to performances by Anita Kittner - a young 
Swedish woman who dived from a platform 63 feet above the escalator hall into a small 
pool of water.
xii Bentall’s found such stunts particularly valuable in drawing in a 
potentially huge customer-base from London and its south-western hinterland, who would 
not necessarily have otherwise visited Kingston. Another celebrated department store 
impresario was Jimmy Driscoll, manager of Kennards of Croydon (of the Debenhams 
  6group) on London’s southern borders. Driscoll once appeared in court for obstructing the 
shopping centre, after a stunt involving two elephants, borrowed from a circus to promote 
a ‘Jumbo’ birthday sales event. This was one of many crowd-pulling innovations by 
Driscoll to promote sales and bargains, including ‘Clock Days,’ where bargains were 
offered as the clock struck each hour, and managing director’s ‘blue pencil’ days, where 
he would lead a column of shoppers through the store, slashing prices with a blue pencil 
as he passed along the sales floor.
xiii
Stores commonly hosted exhibitions (usually on their less lucrative upper floors) to 
draw in customers. Sometimes these were linked to merchandising; for example in March 
1938 Lewis’s’ Birmingham store exhibited all the furnishings for a four room house, 
designed for a family with an income of £3 per week, for £65, together with a five room 
house, for a family on £5 a week, furnished for £165.
xiv Stocking new electrical consumer 
durables in advance of substantial demand had a similar crowd-pulling effect, 
contributing to the department stores’ role as leading distributors of radios and other 
electrical goods.
xv
The final class of promotional expenditure involved window and in-store 
displays. Display was organisationally and professionally distinct from conventional 
advertising. Larger department stores generally had display departments, which 
competed for promotional budgets with advertising departments and were staffed by 
people with separate skills, training, aesthetics, and professional philosophy to the 
company’s advertising staff. Display expenditure was particularly important for the 
expanding ‘popular’ stores, as it constituted a key element of their sales formula and 
marketing appeal. Yet there was also a more general move towards increased 
emphasis, and expenditure, on display, both owing to the trends towards a relaxed, 
`walk-round’ shop atmosphere and the transition towards `institutional’ rather than 
product-based promotion, as discussed below. 
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The marketing battle and the evaluation of alternative media 
 
  The interwar period witnessed heated debate (both within individual stores and 
in the trade in general) regarding the objectives of promotional activity; the style, 
format, and media of advertising and promotion; and their effectiveness. These were 
closely linked to wider debates regarding changes to the department store ‘marketing 
mix’, to meet new market and competitive conditions. 
The traditional model of British department store selling had involved drawing 
in customers via extensive display of merchandise in the shop windows. These were 
then guided to the correct department  by the floor walker  - who had the dual 
functions of ‘human signpost’ and ‘policeman’ (to avoid time-wasting and other 
undesirable customers). Having arrived at the department in question, they received 
formal, counter-based service, with the expectation of a definite intention to buy some 
specified product.  
Isolated moves away from this formula were already evident by the Edwardian 
period. Stores in the north of England with a mass market clientele, such as Fenwick’s 
of Newcastle and Binns of Sunderland, introduced `silent sales assistants’ to display 
goods without the intimidating mediation of the sales assistant.
xvi However, the major 
breakthrough occurred in 1909, with the arrival of Gordon Selfridge onto the London 
department store scene. The contrast was evident from the shop window, the new 
`open’ school of window dressing being used to advertise the store, rather than 
particular merchandise. Having entered Selfridges, the customer would then view the 
goods on sale via in-store displays and would be free to wander round and select items 
at leisure, without being over-bothered by the sales staff.
xvii  
  8Like his shop windows, Selfridges’ in-store displays, advertising, and other 
promotional activities were used to create a strong brand image for his store, 
constituting a new ‘institutional’ promotional style (which Selfridge is credited as 
having originated during his earlier career with Marshall Fields). For example, the 
‘look’ of advertisements was modified, with the employment of professional writers 
and experiments with a greater proportion of white space in his copy, to make a 
Selfridges advertisement instantly recognisable.
xviii This strategy was pursued with a 
level of promotional expenditure that both dwarfed that of his competitors and rapidly 
provided a bench-mark for their own budgets.
xix Department store expenditure on 
advertising and printing, as a proportion of total sales, is estimated to have increased 
to 2.3 times its 1913 level by 1921, to 3.16%; a level roughly similar to that it 
maintained over the 1930s.
xx  
  Selfridges’ success also sparked a transformation in attitudes towards 
department store advertising, promotion, and display, with emphasis being placed on 
advertising the store as a distinctive brand. For example, in 1926 Frank Chitham of 
Harrods told a visiting delegation from the U.S. Retail Research Association that he 
aimed, ‘to devote more space to “policy” advertising, and less space to the detail of 
the goods offered for sale. Advertising seems to me to have a far wider function than 
merely selling goods – its greater mission in future will be to advertise the store as 
well as – or instead of – its merchandise.’
 xxi Chitham was concerned about growing 
competition from the multiples, which enjoyed a particularly strong brand image 
through a well-developed ‘corporate style’, which gave each branch store a near-
identical sales appeal and thus built up brand loyalty. As Chitham later wrote, variety 
chains such as Woolworths and Marks & Spencer: 
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taking them there, and they revel in the freedom of these places – where 
else can they spend their sixpence to such advantage?...  At the weekend 
these places have become a kind of social centre, particularly in the outer 
suburbs and country and seaside towns. Visiting them is to many people a 
form of inexpensive recreation, a mild excitement and has become to 
countless thousands a favourite way of spending time and money.
xxii
 
One cornerstone of the leisure appeal of expanding variety chains such as Marks 
& Spencer, Woolworths, C&A, and British Home Stores was the use of  modern 
display techniques to increase their popular appeal. Displayed goods with clearly 
marked prices were key to attracting customers who had limited incomes and lived in 
fear of being faced with a bill in excess of what they had expected. Among the 
department stores, this approach was most strongly embraced by those serving the 
‘mass market’. Lower-middle and working-class customers (who constituted a 
substantially larger share of consumers expenditure than during the pre-1914 period) 
were drawn in by the development of far more informal atmosphere –involving 
extensive use of displays and ‘silent selling’ aids to increase product visibility, while 
clear signposting within the store replaced the shopwalker’s role as ‘human 
signpost’.
xxiii Sales staff were told to maintain a discreet distance and wait for the 
customer to approach them. As the staff rules for Frasers of Glasgow noted: ‘Some 
customers come in “just to look around.” …It should be remembered at all times that 
Customers are the shop’s guests…’ Thus a suitable greeting was ‘good morning 
madam’ rather than ‘Is there anything you require?’ – which implied an obligation to 
purchase. 
xxiv
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Stores serving a more up-market clientele proved slower to abandon an 
established retailing formula which suited their customer base. For example, Corina’s 
history of the Debenham’s group (which included stores serving very different income 
brackets) noted that its chairman, Sir Frederick Richmond, disapproved of ‘popular 
shopkeeping’ based around new display techniques, sales events and price cutting.
xxv 
Yet while the group’s prestigious London stores and a few up-market provincial 
stores were protected from the new methods, he did not stand in the way of such 
developments in the group’s 'C’ (popular provincial stores). Here managers very 
profitably, ‘splashed whitewash messages across their windows and replaced carpets 
with lino and low-cost fittings… glass cases replaced wooden counters.’
xxvi  
The new display techniques also provided an opportunity to show goods within 
their broader context. ‘Ensemble’ or ‘assembly’ selling, where – for example – 
complete outfits of clothes, or room sets of furniture, were displayed together, proved 
particularly popular with customers who were not comfortable on relying on shop 
assistants (with their own agendas of maximising sales and/or shifting slower stock) 
for advice. A ready-made look also appealed to customers who lacked the self-
confidence to rely on their own judgement of what items would go together.
xxvii
  The new philosophy also involved a re-evaluation of press advertising policy. 
For example, Chitham demonstrated some scepticism regarding the returns to 
advertising, noting that the expanding multiples and co-operatives generally had 
minimal advertising budgets.
xxviii Harrods’ 1925 ratio of advertising expenditure to 
sales, 2.89 per cent, was believed to be the lowest of the large London stores.
xxix Even 
Selfridges began to question the emphasis placed on press advertising. For example, a 
  11report on the group’s Northampton store, Brice & Sons Ltd, noted that recent heavy press 
advertising had not been worthwhile. 
 
The Press men say that although we cannot key results from these ads., 
‘we are keeping our name before the Public.’ Well, I think we could do 
that equally as well with smaller space, and the use of the rest of the 
appropriation in direct mailing form letters, booklets, window displays, 
window lighting after hours and demonstrations.
xxx
 
The John Lewis Partnership took an even more sceptical view. After 
experimenting with a substantial advertising campaign for their Peter Jones store their 
chairman, John S. Lewis, wrote to all buyers and some key executives in June 1927, 
asking their views regarding whether the group should give up advertising in favour of an 
alternative strategy of plastering the group’s stores, delivery vans, etc. `with a notice that 
“we do not advertise: we sell cheap instead”.’
xxxi His main reservation (apart from a fear 
that he might not be in possession of full information as to the impact of their advertising) 
was that ‘the Press is a useful friend and an inconvenient enemy… there is something of a 
family feeling between the Press and large advertisers.’
xxxii
Replies from buyers were fairly equally divided, while the partnership’s 
Establishment Director and Chairman of the ‘Committee for Economy’ were both against 
advertising. Lewis concluded that ‘the only justification for going on is a mere belief that 
if we spend the same amount year after year our advertisements will become more and 
more fruitful. I doubt this extremely.’
xxxiii Furthermore, evidence collected by the 
Partnership’s Intelligence Department indicated that their competitors both provided 
poorer value and made:  
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will discover to be untrue. It seems to me quite unlikely that they would thus 
sell dear and damage their own reputation for good faith if they could 
advertise profitably without doing so and that, since we shall certainly never 
do either, we had better leave advertising alone and follow the policy of John 
Lewis & Co. and Bourne & Hollingworth… of having a reasonably good 
position for window trade and taking great care to give really good value.
xxxiv
 
As Table 1 shows, John Lewis’s and Peter Jones spent only a fraction of the 
percentage of sales revenue that most of their competitors devoted to advertising and 
promotion, while most of this was devoted to display. Yet the group found other ways to 
publicise their low prices – which constituted the cornerstone of their marketing appeal, 
despite the Partnership’s relatively ‘high-class’ customer base.
xxxv For example, in the 
early months of 1931 John Lewis flouted resale price maintenance by discounting price-
maintained brands. When the manufacturers cut off supplies, they purchased new stock 
from wholesalers, which was again discounted, the incident being publicised as an 
illustration of the Partnership’s low prices.
xxxvi However, one area where the firm was 
prepared to spend money was promotional display – with a  display-to-sales ratio at its 
John Lewis and Peter Jones stores roughly equal to that of Harrods. 
[Table 1 near here]  
The John Lewis Partnership also retained a preference for the earlier style of 
informative window displays, advertising the stock rather than the store.
xxxvii This 
approach had much in common with the Partnership’s opposition to press advertising 
– both flashy adverts and flashy window displays detracted from its sober market 
image as a provider of good quality, keenly-priced merchandise. While it ran counter 
to what was successful elsewhere, it may have paid dividends through allowing the 
  13Partnership to project a strong and unique brand image of low prices and solid 
respectability, differentiating it from its ‘modernising’ counterparts in the highly 
competitive central London market. 
  The John Lewis Partnership’s fears regarding the dubious reputation of press 
advertising and its negative reputational impact were echoed by a number of other stores, 
during a time when advertising was not effectively regulated by either legislation or 
industry codes. The Lewis’s of Liverpool group publicly condemned misleading 
advertising and gave its support in the mid-1930s to a national campaign to regulate the 
description of goods in advertisements.
xxxviii  Similarly, Chitham privately condemned:  
 
constant overstatement, if not actual misrepresentation of values. Bankrupt 
stocks bought at 30 per cent. Goods offered at 40 per cent below cost, Half 
Manufacturers’ prices, and so on from day to day. We see it and say 
nothing…But when this kind of thing is occupying nearly three times as 




III Regionally Diverging Promotional Strategies 
 
Department store promotional expenditure can be examined quantitatively, owing 
to the systematic collection of establishment-level data for the period 1931-38. Drawing 
on the experience of a similar industry/academic collaboration in the United States,
 xl Sir 
Arnold Plant and R. F. Fowler at the London School of Economics undertook a series 
of annual surveys of the operating costs of British department stores in conjunction with 
the store’s trade association – the Retail Distributors Association (RDA) – and with the 
assistance of the Bank of England (which was already undertaking collaborative research 
  14with the RDA). These surveys, conducted annually from 1931-38
xli achieved an 
average sample size of 109.1 stores, involving around 20 per cent of all UK stores and 
a considerably larger proportion of aggregate store turnover.
xlii Participants included 
the great majority of the better-known British stores, the sample covering 
establishments with average annual aggregate sales of over £50 million, and around 
45,000 employees.
xliii  
The surveys provides a detailed breakdown of promotional expenditure, divided 
into the following categories: impersonal (non-labour) expenditure on press advertising, 
direct mail, other advertising, and display; and personal (wage and salary) expenditure on 
advertising in general and on display (See Appendix 1). As personal expenditure on 
advertising was not differentiated by function, this is excluded from the following 
analysis. However, personal expenditure on advertising was not substantial relative to 
impersonal expenditure (accounting for only 5.1 per cent of general advertising 
expenditure for all stores surveyed during 1937). Conversely personal expenditure on 
display, which is included in the data, formed a much larger proportion of total display 
expenditure (39.7 per cent in 1937).
xliv
Returns to the survey were anonymised. However, it proved possible to identify 
contributing stores in the Harrods group, together with John Lewis Partnership’s John 
Lewis and Peter Jones stores, from copies of the returns preserved at the respective firm’s 
archives. Some additional stores could be identified from information published in the 
directory Department, Chain, Co-operative Store Annual.
xlv However, as a positive 
identification required a very close match with both the store’s floorspace and workforce, 
and most stores did not publish full data in this directory, identification was limited to 
only a few stores.
xlvi
Table 1 shows data for the stores that could be positively identified. These 
reveal a diverse range of advertising strategies. Within central London D.H. Evans 
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promotional expenditure with direct mail as the largest single component. Selfridges 
was more heavily weighted towards press advertising, while Harrods devoted less of 
its sales revenue to publicity and divided its budget roughly equally between press 
advertising and direct mail. Yet in absolute terms Harrods spent much more on direct 
mail than the other stores shown, and had the second largest press advertising budget. 
Its lower expenditure relative to sales may thus largely reflect economies of scale in 
advertising (a factor also important with regard to Selfridges). It appears that only the 
largest London department stores could efficiently advertise in all the national dailies.  
For example, in 1926 Paul Jones of the John Lewis Partnership described the Daily 
Mail (with a circulation of 600,000 for the London district, 700,000 for the 
Manchester edition, and 450,000 in the rest of the provinces) as a suitable advertising 
medium only for `mammoth’ stores with extensive mail order departments, though 
national papers such as the Daily Express and Daily Chronicle, with a greater 
proportion of London sales, were suitable for stores such as Peter Jones.
xlvii
Conversely, the John Lewis Partnership is shown to have a radically different 
strategy. John Lewis and Peter Jones had very small promotional budgets, with virtually 
no press advertising and expenditure highly weighted towards display. They relied instead 
on their strong brand image of frugal respectability, underpinned by their ‘never 
knowingly undersold’ policy, to develop a distinct, unusual, and successful competitive 
position as an up-market store with an essentially price-based customer appeal. 
  Kennards of Wimbledon and Bentalls of Kingston (which was classified as a 
southern provincial store but was located on the fringes of the London suburbs) 
provide two classic cases of stores which relied on publicity to widen their market 
appeal beyond customers who would automatically be drawn to their shopping 
pitches. Both relied relatively heavily on display, while Kennards devoted an 
  16unusually high proportion of its promotional budget to non-press advertising. 
Bentall’s also spent heavily on press advertising, probably reflecting its large size 
(out-ranking several major central London stores), which opened the door to 
advertising in the London-wide papers. Meanwhile the southern provincial store 
Palmers had a relatively low promotional budget, again showing a relatively heavy 
weighting towards display. 
  The rest of Britain is only represented by Marshall & Snelgrove’s provincial 
stores. This group (part of the Debenhams empire) was a-typical in that the same 
name was used for all stores, making it more like a chain store than a typical 
department store grouping – where stores retained their original names. However this 
was not entirely unique, Lewis’s also having a series of branch stores bearing its 
name. Marshall’s substantial Leeds store had a promotional budget similar to that of 
some major central London stores, with expenditure highly weighted towards direct 
mail. Its Yorkshire branch stores had lower expenditures, particularly for direct mail 
and press advertising. However as all these carried the same name and were in the 
same county, differentiating promotional expenditure by store may be more difficult 
than was generally the case for this sector.  
Surviving returns from the surveys provide a much broader (though anonymised) 
sample of department stores for four years, 1931 and 1934-36 (covering the 12 months to 
31
st January of the following year). These were classified into four ‘regions’: the central 
shopping districts of London (West End & Central), the London suburbs, the southern 
provinces, and the ‘northern’ provinces – including Scotland, northern England, the 
Midlands, and Wales.
xlviii  
[Table 2 near here] 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample, covering key relevant 
variables relating to net sales and margins, promotional media, as well as regional and 
  17store socio-economic class variables. This Table also details the regional and ‘class’ 
distribution of the dataset. It was general practice to divide British department stores 
into those catering for the working and middle classes, and those aimed at middle and 
higher income groups. Stores in the first class were said to compete mainly on price, 
and the second in terms of quality and service.
xlix For example, in the mid-1930s the 
Debenham’s group divided stores into ‘A’ (high class), ‘B’, (popular-medium class) 
and ‘C’ (popular).
l Low-medium class stores had lower average unit prices for their 
goods and had to generate a much higher volume of transactions in order to secure the 
same turnover.  
Regional differences in promotional expenditure and advertising media are 
strongly reflected in the data. Central London and the northern provinces had relatively 
high promotional expenditures compared to the London suburbs and southern provinces. 
This was due to their much heavier press advertising – a medium highly suited to large 
cities, or areas with densely concentrated populations (such as the industrial regions of 
‘outer Britain’). Central London department stores enjoyed a particularly large market, 
which extended well beyond London’s borders for at least occasional purchases (given 
London’s nodal position in British road and rail transport links) and could be extended 
even further via mail order trade. Average sales of central London stores were more than 
six times that of their suburban counterparts, roughly five times greater than stores in the 
south and about four times greater than stores in the ‘north’. Conversely, they faced much 
greater direct competition from other department stores than their provincial counterparts, 
another factor fostering heavy press advertising. 
[Table 3 near here] 
The differing advertising behaviours of central London stores and those in the 
other regions distinguishable from the data are summarised in Figure 2, which provides 
decile break-downs of promotional expenditure across regions. These corroborate the 
  18dominance of central London department stores in both press and direct mail advertising. 
Conversely, ‘other advertising expenditure’ was dominated by stores in suburban London 
and the southern region. Unlike the central London stores these were not located at the 
centre of major marketing hubs and often dealt with geographically dispersed 
populations, which had to be positively attracted to make a special visit to their area. 
Crowd-pulling publicity stunts proved particularly attractive to such stores in drawing the 
public in to shops that were competing for customers not only with other department 
stores, but with other high streets. 
Meanwhile display expenditure was dominated by stores outside southern 
England. It was in Britain’s provincial industrial areas that the trend towards popular 
department store retailing had been initiated and proved most central to successful 
department store retailing. Working-class customers who would be intimidated by opulent 
fittings, counter service, floor walkers, and purchases for which the price was not easily 
determined in advance of the transaction, found ‘Woolworth’ style displays of ticketed 
goods in shops with linoleum flooring rather than carpets much more accessible. 
 [Figure 1 near here] 
 
III Analysing the returns to promotion 
 
  As noted in the introduction, department stores – in common with other 
advertisers, had no accurate means of gauging the impact of advertising expenditure 
on sales, or reliable information regarding the mechanisms through which specific 
types of advertising impacted on their bottom lines. In most cases advertising strategy 
had no clearly defined objectives, the general view being that keeping the store’s 
name clearly in the public eye would pay dividends. With regard to the level of 
advertising expenditure, Corkindale and Kennedy’s observation that ‘in many 
  19instances brands are advertised simply because others in the market are advertising’ 
seems to hold some truth.
li From 1932 the Plant and Fowler surveys provided firms 
with a clear idea of what their competitors were doing. However even prior to this 
firms could roughly gauge their competitor’s press expenditure, by examining their 
advertising space in local newspapers and calculating its cost.
lii
The returns from display expenditure proved even less amenable to 
measurement than advertising, as display stands, enlarged windows, etc., were part of 
the infrastructure of the store, while advertising was transient and variations in 
expenditure could at least be compared to those in sales. The best that stores could 
manage was to ascertain the volume of pedestrian and traffic flow passing by their 
windows. For example, in 1926, when comparing Harrods to two un-named large 
London stores (presumably on Oxford Street), C.E. Wiles noted that, ‘Between the 
hours of three and four o’clock yesterday, 114 Buses passed Harrods doors, 407 
passed one of these stores and 604 passed the other.’
liii   
  The archival and descriptive data beg two questions for quantitative analysis. 
First, did promotion provide strong returns to expenditure, and, if so, which 
promotional media gave the highest returns? The debates outlined above reveal a 
substantial degree of scepticism both regarding the value of certain promotional media 
and the effectiveness of particular approaches to advertising, display, etc. Second - 
given the differing regional strategies – did firms in each region ‘optimise’ the 
marketing mix according to local market conditions? Using the detail breakdowns in 
the Plant/Fowler data, we address these questions empirically via a set of promotional 
medium specific estimations. 
Before examining the impact of advertising and promotion on store 
performance we need to address three methodological issues. The first relates to the 
  20fact that, as pointed out in Schmalensee’s seminal 1972 thesis, ideally advertising 
should measure ‘quantity’, not ‘expenditure’ - which reflects both quantity and 
price.
liv An increase in the cost of advertising, for example, can increase advertising 
expenditures without increasing the number of ‘messages’ conveyed to consumers. To 
account for this possibility nominal advertising expenditure series should be deflated 
using price indices for advertising costs. Doing so is complicated in our case by the 
lack of  annual advertising deflators for the period. There is however evidence that 
prices were quite stable. General price indices followed a mild deflationary trend, 
while available evidence indicates that advertising costs did not shift substantially. 
The Home Market, provides data from the Statistical Department of the London Press 
Exchange, enabling the construction of coverage-weighted regional prices 
incorporating British morning, evening and Sunday newspapers.
lv Cost data are 
disaggregated into the London and South East region, and the regions that equate to 
our ‘northern’ region. These indicate that there was a 0.32% fall in press advertising 
costs for London and the South East over 1934-38, with an average fall of 0.08% 
elsewhere.
lvi Furthermore, we are able to control for these factors at a first 
approximation by including a full set of time effects in the following analysis. 
A second caveat is that endogeneity is not accounted for and this may to lead 
to biased estimates.
lvii The typical approach employed in the literature is to use 
instrumental variable methods with time lags and other exogenous variables and a 
similar approach will be adopted here. To do so we estimate the net margins equation 
using two-stage least squares with lagged sales, and real regional employment rates 
serving to (over) identify the promotion and sales relationship.
lviii The regional 
variables are derived using regional unemployment data, with regional employment 
data being used to re-weigh the administrative regions into the three ‘regions’ 
  21comparable with the survey definitions.
lix The results are that the elasticity of 
promotion is 0.66 using OLS and two-stage least squares estimate is 0.63.
lx In effect, 
the OLS estimator slightly over estimates the responsiveness of promotion on net 
margins.
lxi But results are quite similar, suggesting that endogeneity is not a critical 
feature in our data.
lxii In addition, we employ Hausman’s specification test and find, in 
common with a number of other studies, that the data are not sufficiently 
simultaneous to create statistical bias, and we may proceed using OLS.
lxiii From a 
pragmatic perspective the findings suggest that while we should still be cautious of 
the implication of using the exact coefficients as a guide to returns, they provide a 
close first approximation. 
A third criticism is that we are using cross-sectional data (with year effects) 
whereas advertising can be regarded as a long-term capital investment and is therefore 
unlikely to be fully represented by data for a single year (or, for some firms in the 
sample, 2-3 years). However, evidence indicates that department store promotional 
budgets, as a proportion of net sales, were relatively stable over time during this 
period. Despite the significant upswing in department store trade over 1931-37, the 
ratio of promotional expenditure to net sales for a constant sample of 89 stores had a 
coefficient of variation of only 0.024 (compared to a coefficient of variation for net 
sales of 0.040).
lxiv Similarly, archival studies of Harrods, the John Lewis Partnership, 
and Selfridges all indicate a strong degree of consistency in promotional policy over 
time – regarding both overall expenditure and mix of media. This is corroborated by 
data on those department stores we could identify by name, for which data are 
available for more than one year, shown in Figure 2.
lxv With the exception of Palmers, 
all the stores shown had maintained a fair degree of consistency from year to year 
both in the levels, and mix, of promotional media.  
  22[Figure 1 near here] 
The returns to the various forms of promotion on store’s net margins are 
presented in Table 4. Given the importance of store location and socio-economic class of 
customers, we include a set of dummies capturing regional and class effects as well as 
interaction between them (e.g. high class central London stores, medium class central 
London stores etc.). We also include a variable on the size of the regional market to 
capture aggregate demand.
lxvi Finally, we include year effects to account for idiosyncratic 
events impacting across the economy, such as the recovery of the early-mid 1930s. 
However, perhaps not surprisingly - given relatively stable prices both in aggregate and 
for the central form of promotional expenditure, press advertising - the year dummies 
were not significant here or in any of the estimations that follow. 
[Table 4 near here]  
The results suggest that press advertising, contrary to the views represented by 
John Lewis’s executives and buyers, had a strong positive impact on sales and, therefore, 
net margins. Since both the dependent variable and independent variable(s) are log-
transformed, we can interpret these as elasticities; i.e. as the percentage change in net 
margins when promotion and independent variables are increased by one percent. 
Hence a ten percent increase in press advertising translates into a predicted increase in 
net margins of 2.2 per cent. Direct mail advertising had a well-defined impact on net 
margins, increasing them by almost 1.7 per cent for a hundred percent rise in direct mail 
spending. This does not imply that stores could invest endlessly to obtain these returns, as 
diminishing returns would set in at some point.  
Conversely ‘other’ forms of advertising did not provide robust returns. This may 
reflect an ambiguity in the instructions provided to department stores regarding 
completion of the schedules (see Appendix One). These stated that non-press advertising 
should include `special features, such as trade shows and exhibitions’, but did not mention 
  23publicity events per se, which raises a suspicion that some firms may have included some 
expenditure on publicity stunts under `display’. It is also possible that expenditure on 
publicity stunts was a poor reflection of their effectiveness. The archival evidence 
indicates that the key factor behind success was the presence of a skilled impresario such 
as Eric Fleming of Bentall’s or Jimmy Driscoll of Kennards: the impact of Anita Kittner’s 
diving stunts, or ‘Koringa and her Crocodile’ (who entertained customers at Plummers of 
Hastings), in pulling in the crowds could not be as easily measured by the costs involved 
as was the case for press advertising. 
Yet it was display expenditure that provided the most extravagant returns to 
stores, at a rate of 6.5%. As noted above, the move from counter-service to display of 
goods was one of the key factors increasing the attractiveness of department stores during 
this period. Being able to walk round the store and see a vast array of displayed goods 
was an attraction to all classes. As Frank Chitham noted, ‘there will probably be more 
motor cars outside Woolworth’s or Marks and Spencer stores than any other shop in the 
locality.’
lxvii
  And as we have shown, there were considerable returns to particular media, but 
investment in such media varied substantially by region. This suggests that there were 
major regional differences in the returns to particular media. To get a more precise notion 
of the impacts of regional promotional strategies, we provide a regionally-specific 
promotional analysis. Table 5 presents region specific estimations, starting with the 
medium that generates the highest rate of promotional expenditure, press advertising. 
Press advertising expenditure was heavy skewed towards central London stores in 
absolute terms, however, it also formed over 50 per cent of promotional expenditure for 
stores in the ‘northern’ provinces while southern stores spent less then a third of their 
promotional budgets on press media and suburban stores 15.8 per cent. The resulting 
coefficients point to substantial regional differences in the returns to press advertising. 
  24Perhaps surprisingly, the region with the largest returns to press advertising was the 
‘northern’ region, at 4.7%. Conversely, suburban London expenditures provided low 
returns that are not statistically significantly different from zero. 
[Table 5 near here] 
The second panel of Table 5 details returns to direct mail advertising. This was 
most important for central London stores, who spent an average of around 40 per cent of 
their promotional budget on this media, while stores in the provinces also spent around 20 
percent, reflecting these stores’ not insignificant direct mail business. Though returns to 
central London stores are significant, returns for the northern and the southern provinces 
were slightly higher, and the northern provinces, with a 3.2 per cent return, reaped 
particularly high rewards. Meanwhile suburban London stores appear to have got poor 
returns from direct mail, as was the case with advertising.  
[Table 6 near here] 
The next two panels provide the estimated returns to ‘other’ advertising (non-
press adverts, exhibitions, publicity stunts, etc.) and to promotional display. The results 
suggest that display impacted strongly on the revenues of stores across the regions, 
though most strongly in central London and least strongly in the London suburbs. In 
contrast, panel 3 suggests that outside London ‘other’ advertising did not have a marked 
effect on store net margins. Meanwhile both central and suburban London stores reaped 
strong returns from this form of expenditure. 
Table 6 provides a summary of the estimated expenditure-weighted returns to 
promotion by region (by multiplying the marginal impact of each medium by the actual 
outlay on that medium). As a heuristic to indicate the magnitude of the effects we also 
calculate the returns against net margins. Comparing Table 6 with Table 5 it is evident 
that the London suburban and southern provincial stores reaped relatively low returns to 
promotional expenditure. Central London stores fared much better, but their returns, 
  25relative to net margins, were dwarfed by those to stores outside the south of England. 
Stores in central London and in ‘northern’ Britain – with its large cities and conurbations 
– reaped particularly high returns from press advertising, which was suited to a large and 
geographically concentrated market. These also accrued substantial returns from direct 
mail relative to suburban London and southern provincial stores. ‘Other advertising’ did 
not impact significantly in any region, while display impacted heavily in all regions, 
being the only significant revenue generator in the London suburbs and the south. 
The main thrust of these results is to show the advantages of promotional 
expenditure accrued disproportionately to department store in major cities, or areas with 
concentrated populations such as the northern industrial regions. Meanwhile stores in  
southern market towns or London suburbs faced limited and, often, dispersed, catchment 
areas, which were less suitable for press advertising. Similarly, lacking a strong brand 
image, they were less able to extend their brand via mail order business. Instead they 
concentrated on display, to increase their appeal to local customers and thus maximise 




Major department stores retained and expanded their profitability, despite rising 
competition from multiples with extensive branch networks that often spilled over into 
suburban shopping parades. Promotional activity proved a key means to bringing in 
custom to their centrally located stores, both directly and via mail order trade. It was these 
classic department stores, centrally located within large towns and cities, which spent the 
greatest proportion on advertising and reaped the greatest returns. Conversely stores with 
more limited catchment areas, in London suburbs or southern market towns, had a 
promotional spending mix more akin to their multiple chain competitors - with relatively 
  26low press or mail order advertising and most of their promotional budgets devoted to 
display.  
  Advertising, direct mailings, display, and promotional events were used 
increasingly for the same broad purpose – to imprint a clear brand image in the minds of 
the consuming public, which would be appealing to the market segments which they 
targeted and would differentiate them from their competitors. However, despite a strong 
general relationship between promotional spending and net margin, there was no single, 
deterministic, route to this goal. As the example of the John Lewis Partnership shows, 
even the absence of advertising and rejection of ‘modern’ window display methods could 
be effectively used to imprint a brand image of quality goods at low prices on the minds 
of their customers and thus successfully differentiate themselves from their competitors. 
In general, however, promotional activity appears to have made an important contribution 
to the continued prosperity of the British department store sector which (in contrast to 
their U.S. counterparts) managed to hold their own in the battle against the expanding 




Appendix 1: The survey definitions of promotional expenditure. 
IMPERSONAL 
 
A.  GENERAL ADVERTISING. 
(1). Press. 
Charge here the cost of space purchased in all newspapers and 
magazines, cost of blocks and fees to outside artists and agencies, 
including advertising consultants who render services in connection 
with advertising. 
(2). Direct mail. 
Charge here the cost of all printed matter and periodicals which are 
posted to customers, enclosed in customers’ packages or distributed 
from house to house. The cost of materials, including the cost of 
blocks, of printing, and of stationery shall be included, as well as fees 
to outside artists where not included under (1). Include also the cost of 
postage on all direct mail advertising, and the cost of house to house 
  27distribution, as well as the cost of maintenance, repairs and 
depreciation of multigraphs or similar printing machines. 
(3). Other Advertising. 
Charge here all other miscellaneous advertising expenditure, such as 
cost of space purchased in programmes, trams, omnibuses, and on 
hoardings, cinema performances, including the cost of materials and of 
printing. 
Charge also the total cost of special features, such as trade shows and 
exhibitions. 
 
B.  DISPLAY 
Charge here all supplies used in interior and exterior decoration or 
display, including hire of equipment. Charge also supplies purchased 
for ticket-writing and the cost of ticket-writing by contractors, as well 
as the cost of maintenance, repairs and depreciation of ticket-writing 
machines and other display equipment. 
 
 
TOTAL PUBLICITY (Impersonal). 
. 
PERSONAL 
NOTE. – All Salaries and Wages should include National Insurance Contributions where paid, and a 
proportionate charge for Housekeeping, if provided. 
 
C.  GENERAL ADVERTISING. 
Charge here the salaries of the publicity manager and assistants and of 
the following members of the staff; copywriters, proof readers, typists, 
and all others engaged in the preparation of advertising copy, artists, 
photographers, and generally those engaged in postal advertising and 
other activities of an advertising nature not chargeable to any other 
division. 
 
D.  DISPLAY 
Charge here the salaries of the display manager and assistants, and the 
wages of full-time ticket-writers and window dressing staff, and of 
those employed on the construction, erection, and removal of displays. 
 
Source: British Library of Economic and Political Science Archives, Coll Misc 0330, 
Retail Distributors Association, anonymised survey schedule forms for years ending 
31
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Table 1: Department store sales, net margins and disaggregated promotional expenditures. 
Region Anonymous Store Net sales Net margin   Advertising Expenditure* Display* TOTAL
identifier (£) (£) Press Direct mail Other Total PROMOTION*
London (West  o1  D. H. Evans 1,244,335 118,646 0.62 2.39 0.13 3.28 0.51 3.79
   End & Central) o2  Dickins & Jones 941,921 60,686 2.00 2.31 0.13 4.59 0.41 5.00
o12 Harrods 6,316,076 86,698 1.03 0.99 0.22 2.35 0.20 2.55
o14 John Lewis 1,859,470 227,263 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.28
o15 Peter Jones 728,214 256,022 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.37
o10 Selfridges 4,727,008 86,375 2.04 0.38 0.51 3.02 0.51 3.54
London (Suburban) p9 Kennards (Wimbledon) Ltd 145,668 12,823 0.29 0.46 0.36 1.12 0.29 1.40
Southern  n28 Bentalls Ltd, Kingston-upon-Thames 1,986,259 424,183 1.62 0.14 0.12 2.02 0.87 2.90
   Provincial n3  Palmers (Great Yarmouth) Ltd 109,009 12,823 0.58 0.54 0.02 1.18 0.31 1.49
Wales, Scotland q6  Marshall & Snelgrove, Harrogate 131,854 131,854 0.90 0.00 0.15 1.16 0.09 1.26
  N. England q20 Marshall & Snelgrove, Leeds 246,468 15,008 1.04 1.72 0.00 3.05 0.55 3.60
q21 Marshall & Snelgrove, Scarborough 82,235 2,780 0.50 0.70 0.00 2.24 0.71 2.96
q24 Marshall & Snelgrove, Sheffield 22,521 1,238 0.46 0.29 0.25 1.00 0.42 1.42
q25 Marshall & Snelgrove, York 12,012 847 0.35 0.72 0.00 1.07 0.07 1.13
 
 
Notes: * Average advertising expenditures, display and total promotional outlays are expressed as a percentage of net sales. 
 
Sources: The data are derived from individual returns from Incorporated Association of Retail Distributors, Bank of England, and London School of 
Economics, Operating Costs of Department Stores for the year ending, January 31st 1932 and 1935-37, held at the British Library of Political and Economic 
Science Archive, Coll Misc. 0330. As the data are anonymous, stores have been identified by matching data contained in Chain Store Annual and from 
Harrods company archives and John Lewis Partnership archives. The anonymous identifiers from the original returns are provided for ease of reference. 
 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (N=191). 
Mean Std dev Min Max
Net sales 476,459.00 849,810.90 10,540 6,506,207   
Gross margin 145,192.40 262,830.50 3,253 2,035,197   
Total expense 114,597.90 202,409.10 3,080 1,623,418   
Net margin 30,594.53 63,600.24 137 424,183      
Total advertising 11,864.13 22,955.22 17 156,784      
Press advertising 6,752.89 14,554.64 17 112,956      
Direct mail advertising 4,537.32 10,310.73 0 86,929        
Other advertising 1,363.19 3,128.22 0 25,299        
Display 2,379.81 4,010.88 0 26,797        
Regional Employment (%) 85.50 6.50 75 93
Regional distribution (%)
 Southern Province 26.39 0.44 0 100
 Suburban London 18.52 0.39 0 100
 Central and West End London 15.74 0.37 0 100
 Northern England, Wales and Scotland 39.35 0.49 0 100
Region-class distribution (%)
 High: West End Central London 6.02 0.24 0 100
 High: Southern Province 2.31 0.15 0 100
 High: Suburban London 0.46 0.07 0 100
 High: Northern England, Wales and Scotland 14.35 0.35 0 100
 Medium: West End Central London 9.72 0.30 0 100
 Medium: Southern Province 20.83 0.41 0 100
 Medium: Suburban London 21.30 0.39 0 100
 Medium: Northern England, Wales and Scotland 25.00 0.43 0 100 
Source: Interwar UK Department Stores Survey. 
 
Table 3: Advertising expenses by region (% of net sales) 
 
Region Advertising Expenditure Display Total Obs
Press Direct mail Other Total
London West End & Central 1.72          1.32              0.23          3.10          0.31          3.41          32            
London Suburban 0.12          0.14              0.05          0.27          0.09          0.36          54            
Southern Provinces 0.07          0.07              0.11          0.34          0.11          0.45          37            
Northern Provinces 0.42          0.18              0.07          0.67          0.19          0.86          75              
 
Table 4: Net Margins and Promotional Expenditure for UK department stores 
Advertising
Press Direct Mail Event Display
Full Sample Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
log Promotional form 0.22 (7.80) 0.17 (5.44) 0.15 (1.26) 0.65 (12.51)
log Aggregate Net Sales 0.11 (1.40) 0.00 (1.59) 0.00 (1.30) 0.19 (0.89)
Constant 9.62 (6.42) 8.98 (7.76) 7.17 (7.82) 3.39 (1.57)
Regional YES YES YES YES
Class YES YES YES YES
Year YES YES YES YES
No. obs 198 198 198 184
R
2
0.39 0.40 0.31 0.62
 
Notes:- 1. All regressions include sets of regional, class and year and dummies; 2. Robust t-statistics 
reported.
  33Table 5: Net Margins and Promotion by Promotional Media. 
Press
Southern West End & Suburban Northern England
Region Central London London Wales & Scotland
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
log Press Advertising 0.11 (2.05) 0.24 (2.06) 0.02 (0.89) 0.47 (10.14)
Constant 8.97 (3.08) 9.43 (2.04) 9.15 (6.01) 8.04 (6.31)
Class Dummies YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
No. obs 54 32 37 75
R
2
0.17 0.24 0.29 0.74
Direct Mail
Southern West End & Suburban Northern England
Region Central London London Wales & Scotland
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
log Direct Mail Advertising 0.09 (1.95) 0.08 (2.42) 0.06 (1.03) 0.32 (8.92)
Constant 11.20 (20.27) 10.73 (7.31) 2.68 (5.00) 10.81 (16.60)
Class Dummies YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
No. obs 54 32 37 75
R
2
0.06 0.11 0.27 0.05
"Other" Adverting
Southern West End & Suburban Northern England
Region Central London London Wales & Scotland
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
log "Other" Advertising 0.03 (0.51) 0.44 (0.03) 0.29 (1.66) 0.02 (1.83)
Constant 8.01 (3.05) 4.13 (0.80) 8.70 (5.17) 7.24 (1.82)
Class Dummies YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
No. obs 54 32 37 75
R
2
0.06 0.16 0.29 0.06
Display
Southern West End & Suburban Northern England
Region Central London London Wales & Scotland
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
log Display 0.60 (6.92) 0.75 (7.57) 0.45 (5.41) 0.61 (14.16)
Constant 1.02 (1.02) 1.56 (0.81) 6.75 (4.90) 7.30 (7.36)
Class Dummies YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
No. obs 46 32 37 69
R
2
0.76 0.41 0.56 0.90  
 
Notes:- 1. In all regression sets of regional, and class year and dummies. 2. Regional sales are also 
included to capture aggregate demand but are never significant and so are not reported; 2. Robust t-
statistics reported. 
 
  34Table 6: Mean returns to promotional activity. 
Southern West End & Suburban Northern England
Region Central London London Wales & Scotland
Press 184                5,726                   -                  2,753                      
Direct mail 90                  1,511                   -                  788                         
"Other" -                 -                       -                  -                          
Display 766                3,290                   728                 1,634                      
1,041             10,527                 728                 5,176                      
Returns % (Promotion/Net Margin) 5.9                 9.7                       4.5                  23.8                        
 
Notes:- 1. Returns by medium are derived by multiplying the marginal impact of each medium by the 
actual outlay on that medium; 2. Where coefficients are “insignificantly different from zero” they are 
treated as being zero; 3. The extent that promotional returns effected net margins is expressed as a 




Figure 1: Distribution of promotional-to-sales ratio across types and regions (in 
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Source: Interwar UK Department Stores Survey.
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 Appendix Table 1: Net Margins and Promotion 
OLS IV
Full Sample Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Promotion 0.66 (7.80) 0.63 (5.90)








instrumental variables are lagged net sales and regional unemployment rates.  
Notes:- 1. In all regression sets of regional, class and year dummies;  
2. Robust t-statistics reported. 
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